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Abstract
We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real
truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games of Harrenstein et al. as well as
the recently defined  Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that
a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover
we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the
language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games.
Keywords: strategic games, many-valued logics, Nash equilibria,  Lukasiewicz games
1 Introduction
Various types of connections between logic and game theory increasingly receive attention in the
literature. (We refer to [27] for a recent monograph devoted to several aspects of this topic.) This
paper is a contribution to a special line of research that has been initiated by the introduction
of the concept of a Boolean game in [14]. Originally, Boolean games have been introduced as
two-person zero-sum extensive-form games. However, here we follow the bulk of literature that
views Boolean games as special strategic n-player games, where each player’s payoff function is
expressed by a classical propositional (i.e., Boolean) formula and her strategies consist in truth-
value assignments to a subset of the propositional variables occurring in the payoff functions.
The focus on classical formulas severely limits the scope of strategic games that can be represented
in this format. In particular, one is often interested in finite games with more than just two
possible payoff values, which entails that the payoff functions cannot be identified with Boolean
formulas. For example, nearly all of the well-known strategic games that are usually represented
by a 2 × 2 payoff matrix, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, the Coordination Game,
etc. (see, e.g., [10, 19, 24, 26]), fall into this category. This fact has motivated Marchioni and
Wooldridge [17, 18] to generalize Boolean games to so-called  Lukasiewicz games, where the payoff
∗Supported by projects P402/12/1309 of the Czech Science Foundation; 7AMB13AT014 of the Ministry of
Education, Youth, and Sports of the Czech Republic; RVO 67985807; and Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project
P25417–G15. The work on a major revision of the paper was supported by the joint project of the Austrian
Science Fund (No. I1897–N25) and the Czech Science Foundation (No. 15–34650L). The authors are indebted to
the anonymous referees for their invaluable comments which led to a major improvement of the paper.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
functions are represented by formulas of an appropriate (finite or infinite)  Lukasiewicz logic and the
strategies are assignments of the logic’s truth values to relevant variables. A number of well-known
strategic games, or at least modified variants of them, are representable as  Lukasiewicz games.
Moreover, it is shown in [17] that for any given finite  Lukasiewicz game G there is a propositional
formula ϕG which is satisfiable in the corresponding  Lukasiewicz logic iff G has a pure Nash
equilibrium. In [18] this result is generalized to infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz logic. However, instead
of directly expressing Nash equilibria by propositional formulas, a detour via classical first-order
theories of corresponding algebras is employed.
The main aim of this paper is to generalize and expand the approach of Marchioni and
Wooldridge in at least three different aspects:
(1) We show that the restriction to  Lukasiewicz logics as the underlying formalism for the rep-
resentation of games is neither necessary nor convenient. In fact, rather than just proposing
additional many-valued logic as possible representation formalisms, we aim at identifying
general conditions that are sufficient for representing wide classes of games as well as ex-
pressing their Nash equilibria.
(2) We remove yet another, quite different limitation of  Lukasiewicz games: Marchioni and
Wooldridge [17, 18] identify the set of strategies of a given player with the set of all as-
signments of truth values to the variables controlled by that player. While this makes sense
for Boolean games, it amounts to an unnecessary, and in fact rather obstructive, restriction
in the many-valued setting. As we will demonstrate, by simply using subsets of all possi-
ble assignments to represent a player’s strategies, not only a wider class of games, but in
particular all finite strategic games become representable as logical games.
(3) So far, only the characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibria by logical formulas
has been considered in the literature. We will show that, for sufficiently expressive logics, also
mixed Nash equilibria can be characterized by propositional formulas. The emphasis here is
not on their existence, which in all cases relevant here is guaranteed by Nash’s Theorem, but
on the fact that we may use propositional variables to represent probability distributions
and thus obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the assignments satisfying a particular
formula and the mixed equilibria of the games in question.
Overall, we demonstrate that many-valued logics provide an adequate setting for the formal rep-
resentation of large classes of strategic games, in particular of all finite strategic games. This
includes the reduction of questions about pure as well as mixed Nash equilibria into questions
about the satisfiability of appropriate propositional formulas. While our results immediately sug-
gest straightforward algorithms for checking (the existence of) equilibria, it remains to be seen
which further benefits can be reaped from our logical approach to the representation of strategic
n-person games.
Let us mention some further features that distinguish our approach. While we talk about
“logical games”, the central reference is actually to a wide class of so-called standard algebras, i.e.,
algebras over (subsets of) the real unit interval [0, 1]. For our purpose, the distinction between
formulas and terms over an algebra is in fact immaterial. As already mentioned, in [18] the
existence of pure Nash equilibria is not expressed directly by propositional formulas, but only
indirectly via classical first-order theories of particular algebras. We will show that this detour
is unnecessary. A further item that deserves to be emphasized right away concerns the very
concept of representing a given strategic game as a logical game (with respect to a given algebra).
Note that the notion of representability is only implicit in [17, 18] as well as in the literature
on Boolean games. ([11] discusses succinct representability of Boolean games, but does not refer
to general strategic games.) By making representability explicit, we disambiguate this somewhat
vague notion and are able to formally characterize the scope of representable games. Moreover,
this move supports the identification of different conditions on expressibility that are sufficient to
express Nash equilibria at various levels of succinctness.
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We emphasize that the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that many-valued logics provide
a versatile and very general tool for the formalization of strategic games. Once appropriate notions
and conditions are identified, checking that the corresponding logical representations are indeed
adequate is routine and consequently left to the reader in most cases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic concepts and terminol-
ogy used in later sections: Subsection 2.1 fixes some notions regarding algebras and logics over
(subsets of) the real unit interval [0, 1]. Subsection 2.2 reviews basic game-theoretic notions and
illustrates these by presenting a number of concrete examples that are taken up in later sections.
Section 3 introduces the concept of a logical game with respect to an arbitrary standard alge-
bra. We demonstrate that a wide class of ordinary strategic games can be represented as logical
games and provide corresponding examples. In Section 4.1 we show how (the existence of) pure
Nash equilibria in logical games can be expressed by propositional formulas under rather weak
conditions. Section 4.2 is devoted to the construction of propositional formulas that correspond to
mixed Nash equilibria for suitable classes of logical games. We conclude with Section 5 containing
a short summary and some remarks on possible directions of future research, with emphasis on
dealing with infinite games.
2 Preliminary notions
2.1 Logics and algebras
We will work with logics expressed in various propositional languages. A (propositional) language
L is understood as a collection of connectives equipped with arities. The corresponding set FmL
of propositional formulas is defined over a countably infinite set of propositional variables as usual:
• FmL contains all propositional variables.
• ◦(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ FmL if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ FmL and ◦ is an n-ary connective in L. (We will
use infix notation for familiar binary connectives. Nullary connectives are also called truth
constants.)
• Nothing else is in FmL.
In this paper we consider special many-valued logics, each of which is determined by a single
particular algebra of truth degrees; proof systems will play no role here. (The interested reader
can find information about deductive aspects of the kinds of many-valued logics treated here in
the handbook chapter [21].) We will always assume that each language contains at least three
binary connectives ∧, ∨, and →. We will identify propositional languages with algebraic types,
connectives with operation symbols, and formulas with terms of the corresponding algebra.
Definition 2.1. A standard algebra A (of truth degrees) in a language LA is a tuple 〈A, 〈◦A〉◦∈LA〉,
where:
• The domain A is a subset of the real interval [0, 1] such that 1 ∈ A.
• For each n-ary connective ◦ ∈ LA, its interpretation ◦A in A is an n-ary operation on A (or
an element of A if n = 0).
• For every x, y ∈ A:
– x ∧A y = 1 iff x = 1 and y = 1.
– x ∨A y = 1 iff x = 1 or y = 1.
– x→A y = 1 iff x ≤ y.
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Note that the realization ∧A,∨A of the connectives ∧,∨ in the algebra A need not be the
minimum and maximum (under the usual order of reals). Even if this will be the case in typical
standard algebras, the only conditions required of ∧A,∨A are those of Definition 2.1, as they
already ensure the validity of all theorems given below. Restricting the interpretation of ∧,∨ in A
to the lattice operations would thus impose an unnecessary limitation on the class of admissible
logics and on the generality of the results.
Example 2.2. Let us list several prominent algebras that can be seen as standard algebras in the
sense of Definition 2.1:
• The two-valued Boolean algebra 2 in the language ∧,∨,→,¬, 0, 1 (where x → y is defined
as ¬x ∨ y; we will not mention arities of well-known connectives).
• The standard G-algebra [0, 1]G = 〈[0, 1],∧,∨,→, 0, 1〉 (G for Go¨del), where 〈[0, 1],∧,∨, 0, 1〉
is the lattice [0, 1] with the usual order, and x → y = 1 if x ≤ y and x → y = y otherwise.
(For G-algebras see, e.g., [3, 4].)
• The (n+ 1)-valued G-algebra Gn, i.e., the subalgebra of [0, 1]G with the domain {0, 1n , . . . ,
n−1
n , 1}. (See, e.g., [3, 4].)
• The standard MV-algebra [0, 1]Ł = 〈[0, 1],&,→,∧,∨, 0, 1〉, where 〈[0, 1],∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is the lat-
tice [0, 1] with the usual order of reals, x&y = max(x+y−1, 0), and x→ y = min(1−x+y, 1).
In MV-algebras (and their expansions), it is customary to introduce the defined connectives
¬x = x→ 0; x⊕ y = ¬x→ y; and x	 y = x&¬y. In (the subalgebras of) the standard MV-
algebra, they are realized as 1−x; min(x+y, 1); and max(x−y, 0) respectively. Let us remark
that MV-algebras are often introduced in the language ⊕,¬, 0, in which case &,→,∧,∨, 1
are defined connectives; the two definitions are term-wise equivalent. (For MV-algebras see,
e.g., [8].)
• The (n + 1)-valued MV-algebra Łn (Ł for  Lukasiewicz), i.e., the subalgebra of [0, 1]Ł with
the domain {0, 1n , . . . , n−1n , 1}. (See, e.g., [8].)
• If the truth constants for all elements of Łn (i.e., nullary connectives 0, 1n , . . . ,
n−1
n , 1 in-
terpreted by the corresponding elements of Łn) are added to the language, we denote the
resulting expansion of Łn by Łcn (see, e.g., [6]). Analogously we define the expansion G
c
n of
Gn by truth constants.
• The standard PŁ-algebra [0, 1]PŁ, which is an expansion of [0, 1]Ł by a binary connective ,
interpreted as the usual algebraic product of reals. (PŁ-algebras are also known as PMV-
algebras; see, e.g., [12, Sect. 5].)
• The standard ŁΠ-algebra [0, 1]ŁΠ, which is an expansion of [0, 1]PŁ by a binary connective
→Π, interpreted as x→Π y = 1 if x ≤ y and x→Π y = yx otherwise. (See, e.g., [12, Sect. 5].)
• The expansions of [0, 1]Ł, [0, 1]G, [0, 1]PŁ, and [0, 1]ŁΠ with nullary operations (i.e., constants)
r¯ for all r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, where each constant r¯ is interpreted by the rational number r.
We denote these algebras, respectively, as [0, 1]QŁ, [0, 1]QG, [0, 1]QPŁ, and [0, 1]ŁΠ12 . (The
traditional symbol for the last mentioned algebra is due to the fact that in [0, 1]ŁΠ12 , all
rational constants are definable from the constant for 12 . For the expansions of the standard
MV-, G-, PŁ-, and ŁΠ-algebra by rational constants see, e.g., [12].)
• The expansion of any standard algebra A such that 0 ∈ A by the unary operation 4
interpreted as 4x = 1 if x = 1 and 4x = 0 otherwise; we denote this algebra by A4. (The
operation 4 is definable in Łn, Łcn, [0, 1]ŁΠ, and [0, 1]ŁΠ12 , so Ł4n = Łn modulo term-wise
equivalence, and similarly for Łc4n , [0, 1]
4
ŁΠ, and [0, 1]
4
ŁΠ12
. For expansions by 4 see, e.g.,
[13, Ch. 2.4] or [4, Sect. 2.2.1].)
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Algebra Functions Domains Pieces
[0, 1]Ł continuous linear linear functions with integer coefficients
[0, 1]4Ł all linear linear functions with integer coefficients
[0, 1]QŁ continuous linear linear functions with integer coefficients and a rational shift
[0, 1]4QŁ all linear linear functions with integer coefficients and a rational shift
[0, 1]4PŁ all all polynomials with integer coefficients
[0, 1]4QPŁ all all polynomials with rational coefficients
[0, 1]ŁΠ12
all all fractions of polynomials with integer coefficients
[0, 1]ŁΠ all all functions f expressible in [0, 1]ŁΠ12
such that f [{0, 1}n] ⊆ {0, 1}
Table 1: Characterization of functions expressible in prominent standard algebras.
Let us recall several standard notions of the algebraic semantics of many-valued logics. (For a
detailed modern exposition see, e.g., [9].)
Definition 2.3. Let A be a standard algebra. An A-evaluation is a mapping e assigning an
element of A to each propositional variable. Every A-evaluation can be uniquely extended to a
mapping from FmLA into A, by setting e(◦(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ◦A(e(ϕ1), . . . , e(ϕn)) for each n-ary
connective ◦ ∈ LA and formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn.
An LA-formula ϕ is satisfied by an A-evaluation e if e(ϕ) = 1. A formula ϕ is A-satisfiable if
it is satisfied by some A-evaluation.
The logic of A is identified with the consequence relation |=A, defined as follows:
Γ |=A ϕ if and only if for each A-evaluation e: if e[Γ] ⊆ {1}, then e(ϕ) = 1.
A trivial, but important observation is that the value of a formula ϕ in an A-evaluation depends
only on the variables occurring in ϕ. Let v be a sequence v1, . . . , vn of pairwise different variables;
we shall write ϕ(v1, . . . , vn), or just ϕ(v), to denote that all variables occurring in ϕ are among
those in v. Given a formula ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) and a sequence of formulas ψ1, . . . , ψn, we shall write
ϕ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) to denote the formula where each variable vi is replaced by the formula ψi.
Definition 2.4. Given a formula ϕ(v1, . . . , vn), we define the mapping ϕ
A : An → A by setting:
ϕA(a1, . . . , an) = e(ϕ),
where e is any A-evaluation such that e(vi) = ai.
For any given standard algebra A, it is an interesting question how to describe the class of all
functions ϕA. The classes of functions expressible in prominent standard algebras are described
in Table 1. These delimitations are of a “piecewise” character, i.e., based on a decomposition of
the corresponding hypercube [0, 1]n into domains; in particular, each row of the table specifies:
(i) whether the functions are all those which satisfy the other constraints listed on the row, or just
the continuous ones; (ii) whether the possible domains are all Q-semialgebraic sets,1 or just the
linear ones; and (iii) how the functions restricted to these domains are characterized.2 For further
details see [20, 22] or [1, Sect. 4.1], where also the (more complicated) result for Go¨del algebras
is presented. Let us furthermore remark that the case of [0, 1]PŁ is a long-standing open problem
related to the so-called Pierce–Birkhoff conjecture [5, 16].
1A set S ⊆ [0, 1]n is (linear) Q-semialgebraic if it is a Boolean combination of sets of the form {〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈
[0, 1]n | P (x1, . . . , xn) > 0} for (linear) polynomials P with integer coefficients.
2In the table, a shift means an absolute coefficient of the polynomial.
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2.2 Strategic Games
We present some basic notions and results concerning strategic games with finitely many players.
In particular, we review the most fundamental solution concept for such games, namely that of
a Nash equilibrium, both for pure and mixed strategies. The examples in this subsection are
intended to illustrate these concepts and are taken up in later sections to demonstrate that many
well known games can be represented as logical games (in the sense of Definition 3.1). We use
standard game-theoretic notation and terminology; see, e.g., [19, Ch. 4–5] or [25].
Definition 2.5. A strategic game G is an ordered triple
G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉, where:
1. N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
2. Each Si 6= ∅ is a strategy set of player i ∈ N .
3. Putting S = S1 × · · · × Sn, each function fi : S → R is called the payoff function (or: utility
function) of player i.
Note that we do not restrict the cardinality of the strategy sets Si 6= ∅ at this point. A game G
is called finite if each Si is finite. An ordered n-tuple of strategies s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ S is called a
strategy profile.
Throughout the paper we will adhere to the following conventions:
• Whenever a symbol is related to a particular player i, then we use the corresponding sub-
script. Thus, e.g., the strategies of player i will typically be denoted by si, s
′
i, etc. If the
subscripted symbol is itself a tuple, then the second index will be written as a superscript
(e.g., sji and v
j
i ).
• For every player i ∈ N and a strategy profile s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ S, by s−i we denote the
ordered (n − 1)-tuple 〈s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn〉. By 〈s′i, s−i〉 we abbreviate the strategy
profile 〈s1, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn〉. The utility of player i ∈ N under the strategy profile
〈s′i, s−i〉 is written as fi(s′i, s−i).
The solution concept of a Nash equilibrium captures the idea of stability in the given game.
When all players choose their strategies according to a Nash equilibrium, then neither player can
profit from unilaterally deviating to an alternative strategy.
Definition 2.6. Let G be a strategic game. A strategy profile s∗ = 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗n〉 ∈ S is a pure
Nash equilibrium of G if
fi(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ fi(s∗),
for every player i ∈ N and every strategy si ∈ Si.
Since one of the main aims of the paper is to show that a very wide range of strategic games,
in particular all finite games, can be represented as logical games, we provide several different
examples here that will be taken up again in later sections. We focus on examples that cannot be
directly modeled as either Boolean or  Lukasiewicz games.
Example 2.7 (New Technology). Suppose that there are three firms sharing a market. In face of
a new technology each firm has to decide whether to adopt it or else to stay put. We assume that
the total value of the market remains unchanged; only the relative competitiveness of the firms
may change in accordance to their decisions. If only one firm decides to adopt the new technology,
it will gain a certain competitive advantage c > 0 and each of the other two firms looses c/2,
accordingly. If two firms decide to adopt then they split the competitive gain, receiving c/2 each,
and the third firm has to bear the full loss c. If either none or all firms adopt the new technology,
no firm will gain or loose anything.
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The payoff vectors of the resulting 3-player zero-sum game are as follows:
Firm 3: adopt
Firm 2
Firm 1 adopt stay put
adopt (0, 0, 0) (c/2,−c, c/2)
stay put (−c, c/2, c/2) (− c/2, − c/2, c)
Firm 3: stay put
Firm 2
Firm 1 adopt stay put
adopt (c/2, c/2,−c) (c, − c/2, − c/2)
stay put (− c/2, c, − c/2) (0, 0, 0)
It is not hard to see that the only pure Nash equilibrium of the game arises if every firm adopts
the new technology. (In fact, adopting is a dominating strategy for each firm.)
Examples of games with infinite strategy spaces arise very naturally in many applications;
however, they are highly non-trivial to analyze, in general.
Example 2.8 (Vickrey Auction). As pointed out, e.g., in [24, 25] many types of auctions can be
modeled as strategic games under certain assumptions. Of particular interest is the second-price
sealed-bid auction with perfect information, also called Vickrey auction, since, in contrast to more
familiar types of auctions, bidders have an incentive to bid their true value.
Our strategic game representing a Vickrey auction has n players (bidders). Independently from
the others, each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} associates a rational value pi ≥ 0 to the object sold in
the auction. This value will be used to define the payoff function and thus is assumed to be known
to all players, as required in all strategic games. The strategy set Si, i.e., the set of possible bids of
player i, is identified with the interval [0, t], where t is some fixed rational maximal bidding value,
greater than maxi∈N pi. Each player only knows her own bid bi ∈ [0, t]. The assumption that
values and bids are capped at some fixed t is not restrictive, as real-life bidders always have finite
bankrolls.) The object is assigned to the player with the highest bid. If more than one player
has chosen the same highest bid then the object is assigned to the player with the lowest index
among those sharing the same highest bid. The price to be paid for the object by that player is
the highest bid made by any other player. This amounts to the following payoff function:
fi(b1, . . . , bn) =
{
pi −maxj 6=i bj if i = min{j ∈ N | bj = maxk∈N bk}
0 otherwise.
A Nash equilibrium for this game is 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉, which means that all players bid
their true value. However there are also other Nash equilibria; for example, if p1 > p2 > · · · > pn,
then 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 = 〈p1, 0, . . . , 0〉 and 〈b1, . . . , bn〉 = 〈p2, p1, 0, . . . , 0〉 are Nash equilibria, too.
Example 2.9 (Electoral Competition). The following simplified model of electoral competition
between two candidates appears in [15]. Let N = {1, 2} and S1 = S2 = [0, 1]. Put:
f1(s1, s2) =

0 if s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}
1/2 if s1 = s2 = 1/2
1 if s1 = 1/2, s2 ∈ {0, 1}
and define the values f1(s1, s2) elsewhere by a linear interpolation. Put f2 = 1− f1.
This game captures the following simplified version of Hotelling’s electoral competition model
[24]. Assume that players 1 and 2 are candidates choosing policies s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1] in order to win
the elections. Each citizen has preferences over policies and votes for either player 1 or 2. In the
latest poll, the preferences show that player 1
• cannot attract extreme right or extreme left voters at all,
• is preferred by centrist voters whenever player 2 chooses any of the two extreme policies,
and
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Figure 1: Payoff function f1(s1, s2) = f(x, y) for player 1 in the simplified electoral competition model.
• ties with player 2 if both adopt the centrist policy.
The values of fi express the ratio of votes for player i so that f1 + f2 = 1. The unique pure Nash
equilibrium in this game is the point 〈1/2, 1/2〉, representing the simultaneous choice of the centrist
policies.
The next example shows that even very simple games may not admit pure Nash equilibria.
Example 2.10 (Matching Pennies). Matching Pennies is a game in which each player i ∈ N =
{1, 2} secretly selects one of the sides of a coin. We may put S1 = S2 = {h, t}, with h for “head”
and t for “tail”. After their choices are made public, the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are given by
the following table:
h t
h (1,−1) (−1, 1)
t (−1, 1) (1,−1)
It is easy to see the game of Matching Pennies has no pure Nash equilibrium.
The previous example motivates the introduction of mixed strategies over the sets Si. In order
to avoid technicalities we confine our attention to mixed strategies in finite strategic games (cf.
Remark 2.15).
Definition 2.11. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game. A probability
distribution pi on the strategy set Si of player i ∈ N is called a mixed strategy of player i. More
precisely, pi is a function Si → [0, 1] such that
∑
si∈Si pi(si) = 1. By ∆i we denote the set of all
mixed strategies of player i.
For any mixed strategy profile p = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 ∈ ∆ = ∆1 × · · · ×∆n we set:
Ei(p) =
∑
s∈S
(
fi(s) ·
∏
i∈N
pi(si)
)
.
The function Ei : ∆ → R is the expected payoff (utility) of player i ∈ N ; its dependence on the
payoff function fi is tacitly understood. A mixed strategy profile p
∗ = 〈p∗1, . . . , p∗n〉 ∈ ∆ is a mixed
Nash equilibrium of G if
Ei(pi,p
∗
−i) ≤ Ei(p∗), (1)
for every player i ∈ N and every mixed strategy pi ∈ ∆i.
Theorem 2.12 (Nash). Every finite strategic game G has a mixed Nash equilibrium.
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Note that the mixed strategy spaces ∆i are uncountably infinite and each of them contains
the original pure strategy space Si via the embedding si ∈ Si 7→ δsi ∈ ∆i, where δsi is the Dirac
probability distribution at si:
δsi(ti) =
{
1 if ti = si
0 if ti 6= si
for each ti ∈ Si.
For every pure strategy si ∈ Si let 〈si,p−i〉 denote the mixed strategy profile in which the mixed
strategy of player i is the Dirac distribution δsi concentrated at si. It can be shown that condi-
tion (1) of Definition 2.11 only needs to be checked against the pure strategies of each player:
Proposition 2.13 ([19, Corollary 5.8]). For any finite strategic game G the following are equiva-
lent:
1. p∗ is a mixed Nash equilibrium of G.
2. For every player i ∈ N and every pure strategy si ∈ Si,
Ei(si,p
∗
−i) ≤ Ei(p∗).
Example 2.14 (Love and Hate). The countable game called Love and Hate was analyzed in [7].
Here we present its finite variant LH. It is played by an even number n = 2k of players. Let
m be an even positive integer. Each strategy space Si is equal to the set
{
0, 1m ,
2
m , . . . ,
m−1
m , 1
}
.
Let h(x, y) = 2 ·min(|x− y|, 1− |x− y|), for every x, y ∈ Si. The payoff functions are defined as
follows, for every j = 1, . . . , k and every strategy profile 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ S:
f2j−1(s1, . . . , sn) = h(s2j−1, s2j), f2j(s1, . . . , sn) = 1− h(s2j , s2j+1).
It can be shown (and later will be verified in Example 4.8) that a mixed Nash equilibrium in this
game is the n-tuple of mixed strategies 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 defined for t1, r1, t3, r3, . . . , tn−1, rn−1 ∈ S1 by
p1(x) = p2(x) =
1
2 · (δt1(x) + δr1(x)),
. . .
pn−1(x) = pn(x) = 12 · (δtn−1(x) + δrn−1(x)),
where |t2j−1 − r2j−1| = 12 for each j ≤ k.
Remark 2.15. The assumption of finiteness of strategy spaces in G makes the ensuing theory
much more understandable and technically easier. While it is possible to relax this assumption
and define the mixed equilibria as general probability measures for games with infinite strategy
sets, many additional assumptions are needed and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies is no longer guaranteed in general—see, e.g., [10]. Moreover, probability measures over
an infinite universe are not directly amenable to a logical treatment since they do not admit any
finite representation, in general. The problem of determining and computing the mixed strategies
over [0, 1] in case of games expressible by formulas in  Lukasiewicz logic is studied in [15].
It is trivial to observe that any bijective re-labeling of the strategies in a finite game preserves
pure Nash equilibria. Moreover, it holds as well for mixed equilibria, as stated by the next lemma.
Lemma 2.16. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 and G′ = 〈N, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {f ′i | i ∈ N}〉 be
finite strategic games such that, for each i ∈ N , there is a bijection ci : Si → S′i and f ′i(c(s)) =
fi(s), where c(s) = c(s1, . . . , sn) = 〈c1(s1), . . . , cn(sn)〉, for every s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn. Then the
following are equivalent for any mixed strategy profile p = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 in game G:
1. p is a mixed Nash equilibrium in G.
2. c(p) = 〈p1 ◦ c−11 , . . . , pn ◦ c−1n 〉 is a mixed Nash equilibrium in G′.
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It can be easily shown that pure Nash equilibria are invariant with respect to order-preserving
maps:
Lemma 2.17. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a strategic game. For every player i ∈ N ,
let gi be a real non-decreasing function defined on the range of fi. Then every pure equilibrium in
G is also a pure equilibrium in the game Gˆ = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {gi ◦ fi | i ∈ N}〉.
Mixed Nash equilibria are invariant with respect to positive affine transformations of the payoff
functions—see [19, Theorem 5.35], for example.
Lemma 2.18. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game. For every player
i ∈ N , let ai > 0, bi ∈ R, and gi = aifi + bi. Let Gˆ = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {gi | i ∈ N}〉. Then every
mixed Nash equilibrium of G is also a mixed Nash equilibrium of Gˆ.
3 Logical games—representing strategic games
In this section, we will first (in Subsection 3.1) formally introduce the notion of a logical game,
followed by some useful notational conventions. In Subsection 3.2 we define and then illustrate
by various examples the concept of representing a given strategic game as a logical game. Sub-
section 3.3 discusses expressibility issues. Finally, Subsection 3.4 provides a series of general
propositions that demonstrate how (wide classes of) finite strategic games can be represented as
logical games at various levels of expressiveness of the underlying algebra.
3.1 Basic definitions
We introduce a special kind of strategic games—so-called logicalA-games. The standard algebraA
plays two related roles in the definition of such games:
• Each player ‘controls’ a set of propositional variables: her strategies are assignments of values
from A to those variables.
• Each payoff function is expressible by a formula in the language LA built from variables
controlled by the players; thus each strategy profile provides the full information needed to
evaluate any such ‘payoff formula’ and the possible payoffs are elements of A as well.
Definition 3.1. A logical A-game, where A is a standard algebra, is an ordered tuple
G = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {Si | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉, where:
1. N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
2. V is a finite set of propositional variables.
3. V1, . . . , Vn are sets of propositional variables forming a partition of V .
4. Si ⊆ AVi is the strategy set of player i ∈ N ; we assume that Si is non-empty for each i ∈ N .
5. The formula ϕi over variables from V in the language LA represents the payoff function of
player i ∈ N ; i.e., her payoff in the strategy profile s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ S = S1 × · · · × Sn is
e(ϕi), in any A-evaluation e such that e(v) = sj(v) for each j ∈ N and v ∈ Vj .
We say that G is:
• Basic if Vi is a singleton for each i ∈ N .
• Finite if Si is finite for each i ∈ N .
• Full if Si = AVi for each i ∈ N .
Finally, we say that an element a ∈ A is G-relevant if a = si(v) for some i ∈ N , v ∈ Vi, and
si ∈ Si; we denote the set of all G-relevant elements of the carrier set A of A by AG.
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Before introducing the notional conventions and commenting on the definition, we present an
example of a logical game that is closely related to the New Technology game of Example 2.7:
Example 3.2. Let NTŁc4 be a 3-player logical Łc4-game such that:
• N = {1, 2, 3}.
• V = {v1, v2, v3}.
• Vi = {vi} for each i ∈ N .
• Si = {{〈vi, a〉} | a ∈ {0, 1}} for each i ∈ N (i.e., the players can only assign the values 0 or
1 to the variable they control).
• The LŁc4-formulas representing payoffs are as follows (see Example 2.2 for the definitions of
the connectives in the algebra Łc4):
ϕ1(v1, v2, v3) =
(
1/2⊕ (1/2 ∧ v1))	 ((1/4 ∧ v2)⊕ (1/4 ∧ v3))
ϕ2(v1, v2, v3) =
(
1/2⊕ (1/2 ∧ v2))	 ((1/4 ∧ v1)⊕ (1/4 ∧ v3))
ϕ3(v1, v2, v3) =
(
1/2⊕ (1/2 ∧ v3))	 ((1/4 ∧ v1)⊕ (1/4 ∧ v2))
Clearly, the game is basic (as each player i only controls the single variable vi), finite (as each player
i has only two strategies, namely, vi 7→ 0 and vi 7→ 1), but not full (as the strategies do not exhaust
{0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1}{vi}). Only the elements 0, 1 are NTŁc4 -relevant, as they are the only elements of
Łc4 that can be assigned by the players to the variables they control; thus, Łc4NTŁc4 = {0, 1}.
The logical game NTŁc4 is a Łc4-representation of the New Technology game of Example 2.7,
where each player’s strategy vi 7→ 1 represents “adopt” and vi 7→ 0 the strategy “stay put”. The
details of the representation (especially how the payoff formulas correspond to the payoff functions
of the strategic game) will be clarified by Definition 3.7 and Example 3.9 below.
Let us now introduce several notational conventions and identifications that will simplify the
further presentation of logical games and formulation of results:
• Recall that we reserve subscripts for the index of the relevant player; a second index, if
needed, is written as a superscript.
• For any i ∈ N , let us enumerate the propositional variables in Vi as Vi = {v1i , . . . , v|Vi|i }.
The tuple 〈v1i , . . . , v|Vi|i 〉 will be denoted by vi.
• By Definition 3.1, the strategies of player i ∈ N , or the elements of Si, are (some) mappings
from the player’s set of controlled variables Vi to A. Thanks to the fixed enumeration of Vi,
player i’s strategies si ∈ Si can be identified with tuples 〈s1i , . . . , s|Vi|i 〉 of elements of A, where
sji = si(v
j
i ), for each i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Vi|}. Most of the time we will view i’s strategies as
tuples rather than mappings, but freely switch between both meanings. (Formally, we just
identify A|Vi| and AVi .)
• Since each player’s strategies can be regarded as tuples of elements of A, a strategy profile
s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 can be viewed as the tuple of tuples 〈〈s11, . . . , s|V1|1 〉, . . . , 〈s1n, . . . , s|Vn|n 〉〉,
which can in turn be identified with the concatenation of the inner tuples:
s = 〈s11, . . . , s|V1|1 , . . . , s1n, . . . , s|Vn|n 〉,
i.e., a |V |-tuple of elements of A. Simultaneously, the strategy profile can be identified with
a mapping from V to A, assigning to each vji ∈ V the element sji ∈ A. That is, each strategy
profile can also be regarded as an evaluation (a truth-value assignment) of all propositional
variables in V . Again, we will freely switch between these representations of a strategy
profile.
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• Similarly, the set V can be regarded as a |V |-tuple
v = 〈v1, . . . ,vn〉 = 〈v11 , . . . , v|V1|1 , . . . , v1n, . . . , v|Vn|n 〉.
This will allow us to write ϕi(v) to signify that the variables occurring in ϕi are among those
in v and to write ϕAi (s) for the value of ϕi in the evaluation determined by the strategy
profile s.
• Recall from Lemma 2.16 that we write c(s) for 〈c1(s11), . . . , c1(s|V1|1 ), c2(s12), . . . , cn(s|Vn|n )〉.
Similarly, we write e(v) for 〈e(v11), . . . , e(v|Vn|n )〉.
Example 3.3. Recall the logical Łc4-game NTŁc4 of Example 3.2. By our conventions, the set
V can be regarded as the triple v = 〈v11 , v12 , v13〉, or simply 〈v1, v2, v3〉 since the game is basic.
Similarly, each strategy si ∈ Si can be identified with the 1-tuple (i.e., an element) s1i ∈ [0, 1];
thus, due to the limited choice of elements by each player and the fact that the game is basic,
we can identify Si with the set {0, 1} ⊆ A. Each strategic profile s ∈ S can thus be viewed as
a triple 〈s1, s2, s3〉 ∈ {0, 1}3 ⊆ A3, or as an Łc4-evaluation of the propositional variables v1, v2, v3
(by values 0 or 1).
Let us now discuss our definition of a logical A-game. Definition 3.1 generalizes three classes of
formalized models of strategic games appearing in the literature: the well-known Boolean games in
strategic form of Harrenstein et al. [14] are full 2 -games; the finite  Lukasiewicz games of [17, 18] are
full Łn- or Łcn-games;3 and the infinite  Lukasiewicz games introduced in [18] are full [0, 1]QŁ-games.
Our approach, however, is versatile enough to encompass also other types of strategic games,
which are not directly captured by the two mentioned subclasses. In particular, note that whenever
the payoff functions in the strategic game are of a type included in Table 1 in Section 2.1, then
we can represent the game as a logical A-game, where A is the corresponding algebra specified in
the first column of the table.
Furthermore note that if a game G is full, then AG = A. However, it should be stressed that
in many games A 6= AG: i.e., not all elements of A are available for the players as evaluations
for the variables they control. In particular a logical A-game G can be finite even if the algebra A
itself is infinite. While this may look unintuitive at the first glance, it is actually not too different
from the classical case, where we could also assume that strategy sets of the players may be coded
as proper subsets of real numbers. The main role of A is to provide a way to express payoffs as
formulas. The flexibility in modeling strategy sets yields two major advantages over the previous
approaches:
• A much wider class of strategic games can be represented in our framework compared to the
previous approaches (for details see Section 3.2).
• We can extend the algebra A by adding more elements to its domain or adding more op-
erations to express further properties of games (see Section 4.2). Moreover, if we keep the
strategy sets and payoff formulas unchanged, the resulting game will remain essentially the
same (as the payoff formulas of the original game are also formulas of the larger game and we
have only extended the codomain of their evaluations, but not the evaluations themselves).
The following proposition formalizes the second claim using the notion of a subreduct : A is
a subreduct of B if A ⊆ B, LA ⊆ LB , and the operations of A are the restrictions of those in B
to A. (If LA = LB , we speak of a subalgebra A of B ; if A = B, then A is called a fragment of B .)
3Marchioni and Wooldridge formulate their results for what in our terminology are full Łcn-games. However,
they also show that characteristic functions for all the elements of the domains of these algebras can be expressed
by Łn-formulas (see Section 3.3 and Definition 3.15 below). In this sense also full Łn-games are covered in [17, 18].
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Proposition 3.4. Let A be a subreduct of B . Then every logical A-game is also a logical B-game.
Proposition 3.4 allows us to view all A-games, for all algebras A from Example 2.2, as logical
[0, 1]ŁΠ12 -games and use all the expressive power of this logic (see Table 1) to analyze these games
(see Section 4.2, where it will allow us to expressed mixed Nash equilibria of all finite logical
games).
The following trivial proposition shows that restricting the set of strategies in A-games pre-
serves pure Nash equilibria, provided they remain available in the restricted game.
Proposition 3.5. Let G = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {Si | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 and G′ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 be logical A-games such that Si ⊆ S′i for all i ∈ N . If the
strategy profile s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn in G is a pure Nash equilibrium of G′, then it is a pure Nash
equilibrium of G as well.
Sometimes we can reverse the implication:
Example 3.6. Let G = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {Si | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 and G′ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉, where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and for each i ≤ n: Vi = V ′i = {vi}
(i.e., both G and G′ are basic), Si = [0, 1] ∩Q, and S′i = [0, 1]; i.e., each player i selects the value
for the variable vi from [0, 1] in G′ and from [0, 1] ∩Q in G (thus G′ is full, while G is not). Then
every pure Nash equilibrium of G is a pure Nash equilibrium of G′ as well: see [15, Prop. 3.6].
3.2 Representing strategic games—examples
As indicated above, logical A-games can be viewed as special strategic games. Thus the notions of
pure and mixed Nash equilibria are defined for logical games exactly for strategic games, using the
payoff functions ϕAi (s). We have also seen, at the end of Section 2.2, that strategic games related to
one another by simple transformations share (pure and/or mixed) Nash equilibria. The following
definition spells out what it means to represent a given strategic game by a logical A-game and
adapts the corresponding classes of transformations between games to our setting.
Definition 3.7. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a strategic game and let A be a
standard algebra. We say that G is represented by a logical A-game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {S′i |
i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N if:
1. g : [0, 1]→ R is a strictly increasing function.
2. ci : Si → S′i is a bijection for each i ∈ N .
3. fi(s) = g(ϕ
A
i (c(s))) for each s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn.
The representation is called affine if g is an affine function.
Using Lemmas 2.16–2.18 we obtain the following basic fact, which shows how the Nash equi-
libria of a strategic game and its logical representation are related. For a mixed strategy p in G
and bijections ci as above, c(p) denotes the corresponding image of p in Gˆ, just as in Lemma 2.16.
Lemma 3.8. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a strategic game and let Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 be a logical A-game representing G via g and c. Then:
1. A strategy profile s∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium in G iff c(s∗) is a pure Nash equilibrium
in Gˆ.
2. If G is finite and the representation is affine, then p∗ is a mixed Nash equilibrium in G iff
c(p∗) is a mixed Nash equilibrium in Gˆ.
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In Section 3.4 we state a series of propositions, demonstrating that wide classes of finite games
can be (affinely) represented by appropriate logical games of various levels of complexity. Ulti-
mately, Proposition 3.26 shows that for a sufficiently expressive algebra A, all finite games can
be represented (though not necessarily affinely) as logical A-games. We will see that many of
those representations are nevertheless affine and thus preserve even mixed equilibria. However,
the representations that are directly obtained from those propositions are using rather complex
formulas, in general. In the following, we revisit the examples from Section 2.2 to indicate that
many prominent strategic games can in fact be logically represented in a more compact and natural
fashion.
Example 3.9. Recall the strategic game New Technology of Example 2.7 (let us denote it by NT )
and the logical Łc4-game NTŁc4 of Example 3.2. Definition 3.7 makes precise in which sense NTŁc4
represents NT :
• There are just two strategies (“adopt” and “stay put”) for each player i in NT . As hinted in
Example 3.2, these are encoded by assigning the values 1 and 0, respectively, to the variable
vi the player controls in NTŁc4 . This provides the bijection ci between the two-element
strategy sets of player i in both games.
• Recall from Example 3.3 that strategy profiles in NTŁc4 can be viewed as triples 〈a1, a2, a3〉 ∈{0, 1}3 evaluating the variables v1, v2, v3. By the interpretation of the connectives in Łc4 (see
Example 2.2), the payoff formula ϕ1 of NTŁc4 (defined in Example 3.2) evaluates as
ϕ
Łc4
1 (a1, a2, a3) =
(
1
2
+
a1
2
)
−
(
a2
4
+
a3
4
)
for each a1, a2, a3 ∈ {0, 1}, and similarly for ϕ2 and ϕ3. Observe that the resulting values
{0, 14 , 12 , 34 , 1} of the payoff formulas ϕi in Łc4 can be transformed to the corresponding payoff
values
fi(s) ∈ {−c, − c/2, 0, c/2, c}
(as defined for each corresponding strategy profile s of NT in Example 2.7) by the strictly
increasing function g : x 7→ 2c(x − 12 ) from [0, 1] to R. The representation is affine, as g is
clearly an affine function.
Thus the logical game NTŁc4 represents the finite strategic game New Technology affinely, therefore
both games have the same pure and mixed Nash equilibria (modulo the transformation by c and g).
Example 3.10. The finite variant LH of Love and Hate from Example 2.14 can be affinely
represented as a (full and basic) logical Łm-game LHŁm . First observe that each strategy space
Si =
{
0, 1m ,
2
m , . . . ,
m−1
m , 1
}
is just the universe of the finite  Lukasiewicz chain Łm. We can thus
take Vi = {vi} and ci as identity for each i ∈ N .
Using the interpretation of connectives in Łm (see Example 2.2), one can easily verify that
h(x, y) = ηŁm(x, y) for the LŁm-formula η defined as
η(x, y) =
(
θ(x, y) ∧ ¬θ(x, y))⊕ (θ(x, y) ∧ ¬θ(x, y)),
where θ(x, y) = ¬(x→ y)∨¬(y → x). (Observe that θŁm(x, y) = |x− y| for every x, y ∈ Si.) The
payoff functions are thus directly expressible by LŁm -formulas ϕ2j−1 = η(v2i−1, v2i) for odd players
and ϕ2j = ¬η(v2j , v2j+1) for even players. The representation is affine, as the transformation g is
the identity function.
Example 3.11. Recall the Vickrey Auction game from Example 2.8. This game of n players
is determined by values each player associates to the object sold in the auction. Recall that we
assume that the values p1, . . . , pn are non-negative rational numbers and that bids b1, . . . , bn of all
players are from the interval [0, t] for some rational number t > maxi≤n pi.
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Let us consider a [0, 1]4QŁ-game VA4QŁ, where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, V = {v1, . . . , vn}, and for each
i ∈ N , we put Vi = {vi}, Si = [ 12 , 1], and the payoff formulas ϕi(v1, . . . , vn) are constructed as
follows.
Let ri =
t+pi
2t be the truth constant corresponding to
t+pi
2t (recall that we assume t and all pi
to be rational). Let v = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 and define:
κi(v) =
∨
j 6=i
vj
ιi(v) = 4
((∨
j
vj
)
→ vi
)
∧ ¬4
(
vi →
∨
j<i
vj
)
(if i = 1, then the empty disjunction
∨
j<i vj is understood as 0). The payoff formula ϕi is defined
as follows (for the definition of connectives in the algebra [0, 1]4QŁ see Example 2.2):
ϕi(v) =
(
1
2 ⊕
(
ιi(v) ∧
(
ri 	 κi(v)
)))	 (ιi(v) ∧ (κi(v)	 ri)).
We can show that VA4QŁ affinely represents the Vickrey auction game via g(x) = 2t(x − 12 ) and
ci(x) =
t+x
2t for each i ∈ N .
First observe that ι
[0,1]4QŁ
i (v) indicates the player who wins the auction. Indeed, for each
b1, . . . , bn ∈ [0, t],
ι
[0,1]4QŁ
i (c(b)) =
{
1 if bi ≥ max
j∈N
bj and bi > max
j<i
bj ,
0 otherwise,
where c(b) denotes the tuple 〈c1(b1), . . . , cn(bn)〉. Furthermore notice that if i wins the auction,
then κi represents the second highest bid, i.e., the price to be paid for the auctioned object:
κ
[0,1]4QŁ
i (c(b)) = max
j 6=i
cj(bj) =
1
2 +
maxj 6=i bj
2t .
Consequently, by the semantics of the connectives in [0, 1]4QŁ (see Example 2.2), for each b1, . . . , bn ∈
[0, t]:
ϕ
[0,1]4QŁ
i (c(b)) =
{
1
2 +
pi−maxj 6=i bj
2t if i = min{j ∈ N | bj = maxk∈N bk};
1
2 otherwise.
Thus indeed, fi(b1, . . . , bn) = g
(
ϕ
[0,1]4QŁ
i (c(b))
)
.
Remark 3.12. Marchioni and Wooldridge [18] aim to show that (a variant of) the second-price
sealed-bid auction with perfect information can be formalized as a  Lukasiewicz game. However, to
achieve that goal they explicitly impose some highly problematic restrictions: (1) all players are
assumed to assign the same value to the object in question; (2) the players can only submit bids
that are smaller or equal to the assigned value; (3) the payoff is set to 0 for all players if there is
a tie at the highest bid. Since the value assigned to the object is common knowledge (as required
in any strategic game), each of these assumptions trivializes the game. Jointly these restrictions
amount to a game that hardly reflects any essential feature of the Vickrey auction. In any case,
our logical game VA4QŁ does not impose any of the three mentioned restrictions.
Example 3.13. Recall the Electoral Competition model introduced in Example 2.9. It follows
directly from the definitions of the two payoffs functions f1 and f2 that both are continuous and
piecewise linear (affine), where each of the finitely many linear pieces has only integer coeffi-
cients. We have seen in Table 3.8 that these functions are represented two-variable formulas in
infinite-valued  Lukasiewicz logic (see [20, 8] for details). This means that the electoral model is
representable as a logical A-game ECŁ, where A is the standard MV-algebra (see Example 2.2).
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h t
h (1, 0) (0, 1)
t (0, 1) (1, 0)
Table 2: Matching Pennies with transformed payoffs
Example 3.14. Recall the game of Matching Pennies from Example 2.10. This game is repre-
sented by the Boolean gameMP2 specified in Table 2, resulting from the original payoff table by
applying the affine transformation x 7→ 12x+ 12 . Thus, A = {0, 1} and we may identify h with 0 and
t with 1. The payoff of player 1 is then determined by the Boolean function f1(v1, v2) = 1−|v1−v2|,
expressible by the classical propositional formula ϕ1 = (v1∧¬v2)∨(¬v1∧v2); f2 can be represented
either analogously or simply as ¬ϕ1.
3.3 Expressible games
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we will study the expressibility of pure and mixed equilibria, respectively,
by formulas of the logics in question. For that purpose we will need an additional condition on
logical games.
Definition 3.15. Let A be a standard algebra and a ∈ A. We say that A has:
• a (definable) truth constant for a if there is an LA-formula a¯ such that e(a¯) = a for every
A-evaluation e;
• a pseudo-characteristic formula for a if there is an LA-formula χa over a single variable such
that for every x ∈ A we have χAa (x) = 1 iff x = a;
• a characteristic formula for a if there is an LA-formula δa over a single variable such that
for every x ∈ A we have δAa (x) = 1 if x = a and δAa (x) = 0 otherwise.
We say that a logical A-game G is:
• weakly expressible if there is a pseudo-characteristic formula for each a ∈ AG in A;
• expressible if there is a truth constant for each a ∈ AG in A.
Clearly if there is a truth constant a¯ for a in A, then χa(p) = (p→ a¯) ∧ (a¯→ p) is a pseudo-
characteristic formula for a. Thus all expressible games are weakly expressible. Also note that if
LA contains the connective 4 (see Example 2.2) and χa is a pseudo-characteristic formula for a
in A, then 4χa is a characteristic formula for a.
Since the Boolean algebra 2 has truth constants for both of its elements 0 and 1, all Boolean
games are expressible. Note that this includes, e.g., the game MP2 of Example 3.14. The
analogous claim is no longer true for (finite-valued)  Lukasiewicz games, but well-known results tell
us the following:
Lemma 3.16.
1. Let a = mn , where m and n are relatively prime positive integers with m ≤ n. Then there is
an L[0,1]Ł-formula ξm,n(v) such that ξ[0,1]Łm,n (a) = 1n and ξ[0,1]Łm,n (x) < 1n if x 6= a.
2. For each rational a ∈ [0, 1] there is a pseudo-characteristic L[0,1]Ł-formula.
3. There is neither a characteristic formula nor a definable truth constant in [0, 1]Ł for any
rational a /∈ {0, 1}.
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4. There is no pseudo-characteristic formula (so, a fortiori, no characteristic formula nor a
definable truth constant) in [0, 1]Ł for any irrational a ∈ [0, 1].
5. Let n be a positive integer and m ≤ n. Then there is a characteristic formula for mn in Łn.
Proof. Claim 1 follows, e.g., from the theory of Farey–Schauder hats as developed in [8, Section 3].
To obtain claim 2 for any rational a = mn (where m,n are relatively prime), it is sufficient to take
the formula
⊕n
i=1 ξm,n, where ξm,n is as in claim 1. Claims 3 and 4 are direct consequences
of functional representation of  Lukasiewicz infinite-valued logic (see Table 1). Finally, in order
to obtain claim 5 it suffices to take the formula &ni=1 χmn , where χmn is a pseudo-characteristic
formula for mn in [0, 1]Ł (a more involved proof of this fact is provided in [17, Lemma 3] and in [18,
Lemma 7.2]).
Thus all logical Łn-games (including, e.g., the game LHŁm of Example 3.10) are weakly ex-
pressible and so are all logical [0, 1]Ł-games G such and only such that [0, 1]ŁG ⊆ Q. Observe
that, consequently, the game ECŁ of Example 3.13 is not even weakly expressible (although it
would become weakly expressible if restricted to rational payoffs).
Furthermore, recall that the algebras Łcn and G
c
n introduced in Example 2.2 contain truth
constants for all elements of their domains; consequently, all Łcn- and G
c
n-games are expressible
(including, e.g., the game NTŁc4 of Example 3.2). Example 2.2 also introduced several standard
algebras containing truth constants r¯ for all r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q: clearly for any such algebra A and
any A-game G, if AG ⊆ Q then G is expressible. (Thus, e.g., the game VA4QŁ of Example 3.11 is
expressible.)
Here we can also illustrate the usefulness of Proposition 3.4: Consider a [0, 1]Ł-game G such
that {0, 1} ( [0, 1]ŁG ⊆ Q. We know that G is weakly expressible, but not expressible. However,
by Proposition 3.4, we can see G as a [0, 1]QŁ-game which has the same pure and mixed equilibria
and is clearly expressible.
3.4 Representing strategic games—general results
In the next three propositions we investigate a particularly simple type of games: finite strategic
games with at most two possible payoff values. Note that all finite win/loose games fall into this
category. It is easy to show that all such games (modulo certain encodings of strategies) can be
presented as Boolean games (logical 2 -games in our terminology). The only possible complication
arises from the fact that the sets of strategies need not be limited to a binary choice. This implies
that each player may have to control more than one variable, in general, so that all of her possible
choices can be represented. This result is implicit already in [14]; however, we make it explicit
and prove it, as it provides a convenient preparation for more complex cases elaborated later.
Convention 3.17. By Lemma 2.16 one may identify without loss of generality any given set
of strategies of a finite game with an initial segment of the set of natural numbers. For sake of
conciseness we will do so in the rest of the paper.
Proposition 3.18. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of ranges of all fi is {a, b}, where a < b. For any i ∈ N , let ni denote the least natural
number such that |Si| ≤ 2ni . Moreover, for any si ∈ Si, let 〈s1i , . . . , snii 〉 ∈ 2ni denote the binary
representation of si. (Recall that by Convention 3.17 we assume that si is a natural number).
Then the game G is affinely represented by an expressible logical 2 -game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {v1i , . . . , vnii } (and V =
⋃
i∈N Vi).
• S′i = {〈s1i , . . . , snii 〉 | si ∈ Si}. (Recall that by our conventions, strategies can be identified
with tuples of elements of the algebra; see beginning of Section 3.1.)
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• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
fi(s)=b
∧
k∈N
∧
j≤nk
δsjk
(vjk),
where δx(v) is a characteristic formula of x ∈ {0, 1} in 2 (e.g., δ0(v) = ¬v and δ1(v) = v).
• ci(si) = 〈s1i , . . . , snii 〉 for each si ∈ Si.
• g(x) = (b− a)x+ a.
Proof. First observe that Gˆ, as specified above, is indeed a logical 2 -game. Moreover, 2 Gˆ = {0, 1},
therefore Gˆ is expressible (recall that the requisite truth constants 0 and 1 are part of L2 ). Clearly
each ci is bijective and g is an affine monotone injection. It remains to check that for each strategy
profile s,
fi(s) = g(ϕ
2
i (c(s))).
It is easy to see that for any strategy profile s we have:
e
( ∧
k∈N
∧
j≤nk
δsjk
(vjk)
)
=

1 if 〈e(v1k), . . . , e(vnkk )〉 = 〈s1k, . . . , snkk 〉 = ck(sk)
for each k ∈ N (i.e., e(v) = c(s));
0 otherwise.
Therefore e(ϕi(v)) = 1 = ϕ
2
i (c(s)) iff fi(s) = b.
Next we show that, instead of working with
∑
i∈N ni ‘binary’ variables, we could represent
such games with just one variable for each player, but at the price of using a logic with more truth
values.
Proposition 3.19. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of ranges of all fi is {a, b}, where a < b, and let m = maxi∈N |Si| − 1. Then G is affinely
represented by a basic weakly expressible logical Łm-game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N},
{ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {vi} (thus V = {v1, . . . , vn}).
• S′i =
{
si
m | si ∈ Si
}
.
• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
fi(s)=b
∧
k∈N
δ sk
m
(vk),
where δx(v) is a characteristic formula of x in Łm. (Recall from Lemma 3.16 that there is
a characteristic formula for each element of Łm.)
• ci(si) = sim for each si ∈ Si.
• g(x) = (b− a)x+ a.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.18. Besides small structural differences—
the current game is only weakly expressible and basic—we only alter (actually simplify) the key
observation for any strategy profile s:
e
( ∧
k∈N
δ sk
m
(vk)
)
=
{
1 if 〈e(v1), . . . , e(vn)〉 =
〈
s1
m , . . . ,
sn
m
〉
= c(s);
0 otherwise.
Thus we still have e(ϕi(v)) = 1 = ϕ
Łm
i (c(s)) iff fi(s) = b.
Of course, one can combine the previous two approaches and work with any number of truth
values between 2 and maxi∈N |Si| at the price of using more variables, and we can render it in dif-
ferent logics. Let us now formalize these ideas in the next proposition (note that Propositions 3.18
and 3.19 are its corollaries).
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Proposition 3.20. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of ranges of all fi is {a, b}, where a < b. Let m ≥ 1 and ni be the least integer such that
|Si| ≤ (m+ 1)ni and let us, for a given si ∈ Si denote the (m + 1)-ary representation of si by
〈s1i , . . . , snii 〉 ∈ {0, . . . ,m}ni .
Moreover let A be a standard algebra with distinct elements x0, . . . , xm ∈ A such that for each
i ≤ m there is a characteristic formula δi(v) for xi in A.
Then G is affinely represented by a weakly expressible logical A-game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N},
{S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {〈v1i , . . . , vnii 〉} (thus V =
⋃
i∈N Vi).
• S′i =
{〈
xs1i , . . . , xs
ni
i
〉 | si ∈ Si}.
• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
fi(s)=b
∧
k∈N
∧
j≤nk
δsjk
(vjk).
• ci(si) =
〈
xs1i , . . . , xs
ni
i
〉
for each si ∈ Si.
• g(x) = (b− a)x+ a.
Furthermore, the representing game is basic iff m ≥ maxi∈N |Si| − 1.
Proof. A straightforward combination of the proofs of Propositions 3.18 and 3.19.
Now we leave games with binary payoffs and deal with the strategic games with any finite
number r of possible payoff values. To achieve a more digestible presentation, we first formulate a
result for a fixed infinitely-valued logic and basic games; only then a general variant is presented.
On the other hand, the less general version provides an affine representation, which cannot be
guaranteed in the general case. For simplicity we use the logic given by the algebra [0, 1]4QG (see
Example 2.2); indeed in this algebra we have both the corresponding truth constant a¯ and a
characteristic formula δa for each rational a and thus each logical [0, 1]
4
QG-game G where AG ⊆ Q
is expressible. Notice that by Proposition 3.4, we can as well use the logic of any algebra expanding
[0, 1]4QG, for example [0, 1]
4
QŁ, [0, 1]
4
QPŁ, or [0, 1]ŁΠ12 (as the connectives of [0, 1]G are definable in
all these algebras).
Proposition 3.21. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of the ranges of all fi is a set of rational numbers {o1, . . . , or}, where o1 < o2 < · · · < or,
and let m = maxi∈N |Si| − 1.
Then G is affinely represented by a basic expressible logical [0, 1]4QG-game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {vi} (thus V = {v1, . . . , vn}).
• S′i = { sim | si ∈ Si}.
• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
(
g−1(fi(s)) ∧
∧
k≤n
δ sk
m
(vk)
)
,
where δa(v) is a characteristic formula of a in [0, 1]
4
QG.
• ci(si) = sim for each si ∈ Si.
• g(x) = (or − o1)x+ o1.
Proof. First observe that Gˆ is indeed a logical [0, 1]4QG-game: notice that g−1(fi(s)) is a rational
number, as fi(s) is rational and g : [0, 1] → R is an affine function with rational coefficients;
thus there is a corresponding truth constant and ϕi is indeed an L[0,1]4QG -formula. Moreover,
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[0, 1]4QGGˆ ⊆ [0, 1] ∩ Q and therefore Gˆ is expressible (recall that all rational truth constants are
present in the language L[0,1]4QG). Clearly, each ci is a bijection and g is an affine strictly increasing
function with rational coefficients. It remains to check that for each strategy profile s,
fi(s) = g
(
ϕ
[0,1]4QG
i (c(s))
)
.
Observe that for any strategy profile s we have:
e
(
g−1(fi(s)) ∧
∧
k≤n
δ sk
m
(vk)
)
=
{
g−1(fi(s)) if 〈e(v1), . . . , e(vn)〉 = 〈 s1m , . . . , snm 〉 = c(s);
0 otherwise.
Therefore we have ϕ
[0,1]4QG
i (c(s)) = g
−1(fi(s)), as required.
Furthermore, finite strategic games with rational payoffs can also be affinely represented by log-
ical A-games for sufficiently expressive finite algebras A. For simplicity, the following proposition
is formulated for finite standard G-algebras with truth constants and 4 (see Example 2.2); i.e.,
A = Gc4m for sufficiently large m. However, Proposition 3.4 again ensures that all expansions of
Gc4m can be used as well (notice that in particular, Łcm falls within this class, since all connectives
of Gc4m are definable in Łcm).
Proposition 3.22. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of the ranges of all fi is a set of rational numbers
{
p1
q , . . . ,
pr
q
}
, where q, p1, . . . pr are integers
and p1 < p2 < · · · < pr. Let m be a natural number such that m ≥ max{pr−p1, |S1|, . . . , |Sn|}−1.
Then G is affinely represented by a basic expressible logical Gc4m -game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N},
{S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi, S′i, ϕi, and ci are defined as in Proposition 3.21, using δa(v) = 4((v → a¯) ∧ (a¯→ v)).
• g(x) = (mx+ p1)/q.
The proof of Proposition 3.22 is essentially the same as the proof of Proposition 3.21, therefore
we omit it. As shown by the next Proposition 3.24, the presence of truth constants can be avoided
in standard MV-chains Łm of suitable lengths, at the price of having a slightly larger algebra and
only weak expressibility of the representing game. The formalizability of the payoff function in
Łm is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.23. Let m be a prime number, a, b ∈ Łm and a /∈ {0, 1}. Then there is an LŁm-formula
ζm,a,b(v) such that ζ
Łm
m,a,b(a) = b.
Proof. Let a = pm and b =
q
m . Since m is prime, by Lemma 3.16(1) there is a formula ξp,m(v)
such that ξ
[0,1]Ł
p,m
(
p
m
)
= 1m . Since Łm is a subalgebra of [0, 1]Ł, we obtain ξ
Łm
p,m
(
p
m
)
= 1m as well;
thus it is sufficient to take
⊕q
i=1 ξp,m for ζm,a,b.
Proposition 3.24. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite strategic game such that the
union of the ranges of all fi is a set of rational numbers
{
p1
q , . . . ,
pr
q
}
, where q, p1, . . . pr are integers
and p1 < p2 < · · · < pr. Let m be a prime number such that m ≥ max
(
pr−p1, |S1|+1, . . . , |Sn|+1
)
.
Then G is affinely represented by a basic weakly expressible logical Łm-game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi |
i ∈ N}, {S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {vi} (thus V = {v1, . . . , vn}).
• S′i = { si+1m | si ∈ Si}.
• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
(
ζ
m,
si+1
m ,g
−1(fi(s))
(vi) ∧
∧
k≤n
δ sk+1
m
(vk)
)
,
where ζm,a,b(v) is the formula from Lemma 3.23 and δa(v) is a characteristic formula of a
in Łm.
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• ci(si) = si+1m for each si ∈ Si.
• g(x) = (mx+ p1)/q.
The proof of Proposition 3.24 is analogous to that of Proposition 3.21 (just observe that by
Lemma 3.23, ζŁm
m,
si+1
m ,g
−1(fi(s))
(vi) = g
−1(fi(s))).
Example 3.25. By Propositions 3.21–3.24, the strategic game NT of Example 2.7 can be affinely
represented not only as the logical Łc4-game NTŁc4 of Examples 3.2 and 3.9, but also, e.g., as a
logical [0, 1]4QG-game (by Proposition 3.21), a logical G
c4
4 -game (by Proposition 3.22), or a logical
Ł7-game (by Proposition 3.24). Proposition 3.4 and the variability of m in Propositions 3.22
and 3.24 admit further algebras for logical representation of NT , including, e.g., [0, 1]QŁ, [0, 1]ŁΠ12 ,
Łc5, Łc6, Ł11, Ł13, etc. In all these cases, the representation is affine and the representing games
are basic and expressible (or weakly expressible in the case of Łm-games).
Notice that while the payoff formulas produced by Propositions 3.21–3.24 are rather large, a
much more compact logical representation of NT exists in algebras that contain Łc4 as a subreduct:
see the formulas ϕi in Example 3.2. Notice also that despite the representability as an Łc4- or Ł7-
game, NT cannot be represented as a finite  Lukasiewicz game of Marchioni and Wooldridge, since
the sets of strategies and payoff values have different cardinalities.
As already mentioned above, the following general version comes at the price of loosing the
affinity of representations.
Proposition 3.26. Let G = 〈N, {Si | i ∈ N}, {fi | i ∈ N}〉 be a finite game such that the union of
ranges of all fi is {o1, . . . , or}, where o1 < o2 < · · · < or, and let m = maxi∈N |Si|−1. Let A be an
arbitrary standard algebra with distinct elements a0, . . . , am−1 and distinct elements b1 < · · · < br
(the two sets can overlap, though) and such that there are characteristic formulas δi in A for each
ai, i < m, and (definable) truth constants b¯i for each bi, i ≤ r.
Then G is represented by a basic weakly expressible A-logical game Gˆ = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N},
{S′i | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉 via g and c = 〈ci〉i∈N , where for each i ∈ N :
• Vi = {vi} (thus V = {v1, . . . , vn}).
• S′i = {asi | si ∈ Si}.
• ϕi =
∨
s∈S1×···×Sn
(
g−1(fi(s)) ∧
∧
k≤n
δsk(vk)
)
.
• ci(si) = asi for each si ∈ Si.
• g : [0, 1]→ R is a strictly increasing function with g(bj) = oj for every j ≤ r.
Proof. Observe that Gˆ is a logical A-game; moreover, AGˆ = {a1, . . . , am} and thus Gˆ is weakly
expressible (by the theorem’s assumptions). Clearly each ci is a bijection and thus it remains to
check that for each strategy profile s we have
fi(s) = g(ϕi(c(s))).
As before, it suffices to observe that for any strategy profile s we have
e
(
g−1(fi(s)) ∧
∧
k≤n
δsk(vk)
)
=
{
bfi(s) if 〈e(v1), . . . , e(vn)〉 = 〈as1 , . . . , asn〉 = c(s);
0 otherwise.
We obtain ϕAi (c(s)) = bfi(s) and so g(ϕ
A
i (c(s))) = g(bfi(s)) = fi(s).
Just like for the combination of Proposition 3.18 and 3.19 into Proposition 3.20, we could also
put together Proposition 3.21 and 3.26, but refrain from doing so here.
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4 Expressing equilibria of logical games
In this section we show how pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical games can be expressed by
propositional formulas, under particular conditions.
Recall from Lemma 3.8 that whenever a logical game represents a strategic game, it has the
same pure equilibria (modulo the representation); and if the game is finite and the representation is
affine, then even mixed equilibria are preserved by the representation. Consequently the formulas
derived below characterize equilibria not only in logical games themselves, but also in the strategic
games they may represent.
Throughout this section we use the notation G = 〈N,V, {Vi | i ∈ N}, {Si | i ∈ N}, {ϕi | i ∈ N}〉
for any finite logical A-game, where A is a standard algebra. Furthermore, let S = S1 × · · · × Sn.
4.1 Pure Nash equilibria
A crucial observation is the fact that in (weakly) expressible games each player’s choice of a strategy
can be encoded by LA-formulas. In this section we show how this fact can be employed to express
by an LA-formula that a certain strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consequently, as
we will show, it can also be expressed that such an equilibrium exists. For simplicity we start
with expressible games and deal with the more complicated case of weakly expressible ones later.
Recall that in these games we have a truth constant a¯ for each a ∈ AG.
Let us consider auxiliary variables w = 〈w1, w2, . . . , wmaxi∈N |Vi|〉 different from those in V and
define formulas γi(v,w), for each i ∈ N , and γG(v) as follows:
γi = ϕi(v1, . . . ,vi−1, w1, . . . , w|Vi|,vi+1, . . . ,vn)→ ϕi(v1, . . . ,vn)
γG =
∧
i∈N
∧
si∈Si
γi(v1, . . . ,vi−1, s¯1i , . . . , s¯
|Vi|
i ,vi+1, . . . ,vn).
Lemma 4.1. Let G be an expressible finite A-game. Then the following are equivalent for each
strategy profile s∗:
1. s∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of G.
2. s∗ satisfies γG(v).
Proof. The statement is a straightforward consequence of the definition of a pure Nash equilibrium
and the properties of the connectives ∧ and → ensured by Definition 2.1 for all standard algebras
of truth degrees.
Theorem 4.2. Let G be an expressible finite logical A-game. Then the following are equivalent:
1. G allows for a pure Nash equilibrium.
2. The following formula is satisfiable:(∨
s∈S
∧
i∈N
∧
j≤|Vi|
(
χsji
(vji )
)) ∧ γG(v). (2)
Moreover, if the game G is full, then (2) can be replaced just by γG(v).
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 4.1. It suffices to observe that an evaluation e satisfies
the left conjunct in (2) if and only if e(v) is a strategy profile.
Recall that all Boolean games are expressible. Thus Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 apply to
Boolean games [14] in particular. Likewise, finite  Lukasiewicz games are covered. More precisely,
Theorem 2 of [17] amounts to a variant of a particular subcase of Theorem 4.2, where the underlying
algebra is Łcn, only full games are considered, and a somewhat more complex variant of our γG(v)
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is used. Full Łn-games are treated only indirectly in [17, 18], by showing that they are (in our
terminology) weakly expressible. This case is covered by Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4, below.
If the game is just weakly expressible, we have to use a more complex formula instead of
γG to formulate and prove analogues of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2. In fact, we can keep the
definition of the formulas γi, but we have to modify γG to include additional auxiliary variables
that correspond to all the elementary strategies and will play the role of truth constants.
Formally, we introduce new variables {qa | a ∈ AG}, different from those in V and w. Note
that the set AG is a subset of A and thus is naturally ordered. Therefore we can use q to
unambiguously denote the sequence of those variables. Now we can define γ′G as a formula over
the variables v and q:
γ′G =
( ∧
a∈AG
χa(qa)
)
∧
(∧
i∈N
∧
si∈Si
γi(v1, . . . ,vi−1, qs1i , . . . qs|Vi|i
,vi+1, . . . ,vk)
)
.
Note that the formula
∧
a∈AG χa(qa) is satisfiable only by those evaluations that map each variable
qa to a. In this manner we obtain the promised generalizations of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2,
which are then applicable, e.g., to all Łm-logical games and all [0, 1]Ł-logical games with finite sets
of (assignment of) rationals as strategies.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be a weakly expressible finite A-game. Then the following are equivalent for
each strategy profile s∗:
1. s∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of G.
2. The A-evaluation s∗, a1, . . . , a|AG| satisfies γ′G(v, q).
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a weakly expressible finite A-game. Then the following are equivalent:
1. G allows for a pure Nash equilibrium.
2. The following formula is satisfiable:(∨
s∈S
∧
i∈N
∧
j≤|Vi|
(
χsji
(vji )
)) ∧ γ′G(v, q). (3)
Moreover, if the game G is full, then (3) can be replaced just by the formula γ′G(v).
4.2 Mixed Nash equilibria
In order to characterize mixed strategy profiles we have to express probability distributions and
corresponding expected payoffs in a propositional language. On the algebraic side this means that
the additive as well as multiplicative structure of the real unit interval [0, 1] must be employed.
Interestingly enough, there are numerous natural examples of many-valued logics that provide
such a rich semantics over [0, 1]: in particular, the logics of algebras expanding the standard PŁ-
algebra [0, 1]PŁ (including [0, 1]
4
PŁ, [0, 1]QPŁ, [0, 1]
4
QPŁ [0, 1]ŁΠ, or [0, 1]ŁΠ12 , see Example 2.2) fall
within this class.
We proceed with a simple lemma, crucial for expressing probability distributions. The under-
lying idea is based on MV-algebraic partitions of unity; see, e.g., [23]. We present its proof for the
readers convenience.
Lemma 4.5. Let A expand the standard MV-algebra [0, 1]Ł. For every n ≥ 2 there is an LA-
formula δ(p1, . . . , pn) such that an A-evaluation a ∈ [0, 1]n satisfies δ iff
∑
i≤n ai = 1.
Proof. We define
δ =
(⊕
i≤n
pi
)
∧
∧
i≤n
((⊕
j≤n
j 6=i
pj
)
→ ¬pi
)
.
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Clearly the satisfiability of the first conjunct implies
∑
i≤n ai ≥ 1. Therefore ai > 0 for at least
one i ≤ n. Moreover the satisfiability of the second conjunct implies⊕A
j≤n
j 6=i
aj ≤ 1− ai < 1.
This yields the inequality ∑
j≤n
j 6=i
aj =
⊕A
j≤n
j 6=i
aj ≤ 1− ai,
which entails
∑
j≤n aj ≤ 1. The converse direction is trivial.
For each i ∈ N and each strategy si ∈ Si let us introduce a variable psii . Moreover, let pi
denote the tuple 〈psii | si ∈ Si〉. (The tuple is unique with respect to the lexicographic order on
A|Vi|.) For every i ∈ N , any A-evaluation of the variables pi can be thought of as a mapping
Si → [0, 1]. This enables us to formulate a particular instance of Lemma 4.5 and thus to obtain:
Lemma 4.6. Let A expand the standard PL-algebra [0, 1]PL and G be a finite expressible logical A-
game. Then for each i ≤ n there is a formula ProbDistri(pi) such that an evaluation pri ∈ [0, 1]Si
satisfies ProbDistri iff pri is a probability distribution over Si.
As a consequence, an element pr = 〈pr1, . . . ,prn〉 ∈ [0, 1]S , where each pri satisfies the
formula ProbDistri, can be seen as a mixed strategy profile in the game G. This enables us to
define the expected payoff for a player i in a finite expressible logical A-game G as follows:
Ei(p) = Ei(p1, . . . ,pn) =
⊕
s∈S
(
ϕi(s¯
1
1, . . . , s¯
|Vn|
n )
⊙
j≤n
p
sj
j
)
.
Recall that by p−i we denote the sequence of variables p where the subsequence pi removed;
for every pure strategy ai ∈ Si, by (ai,p−i) we denote the mixed strategy profile in which the
mixed strategy of player i is the Dirac distribution δai concentrated at ai. Moreover we define
the expected payoff for a player i in a mixed strategy profile (ai,p−i) as follows:
Ei(a,p−i) =
⊕
s∈S
si=a
(
ϕi(s¯
1
1, . . . , s¯
|Vn|
n )
⊙
j≤n
j 6=i
p
sj
j
)
.
The above definitions and conventions allow us to formulate the following theorem, which pro-
vides the announced logical characterization of mixed Nash equilibria; its proof is a straightforward
consequence of Proposition 2.13.
Theorem 4.7. Let A be an algebra expanding [0, 1]PŁ. Let G be a finite expressible logical A-game
and let pr∗ ∈ [0, 1]S be a mixed strategy profile in G. Then the following are equivalent:
1. pr∗ is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
2. pr∗ satisfies the following formula:∧
i≤n
(
ProbDistri(pi) ∧
∧
ai∈Si
(
Ei(ai,p−i)→ Ei(p)
))
. (4)
Example 4.8. Recall the finite variant LH of Love and Hate from Example 2.14. In Example 3.10
it was represented as a logical Łm-game LHŁm with the same pure and mixed equilibria (since the
transformation was affine via the identity functions g and c). In virtue of Proposition 3.4, LHŁm
can as well be regarded as a [0, 1]PŁ-game, which again has the same pure and mixed equilibria.
A routine calculation shows that the n-tuple pr∗ of the mixed strategies 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 defined in
Example 2.14 satisfies the formula (4) in [0, 1]PŁ, and thus pr
∗ is indeed a mixed Nash equilibrium
in LH and LHŁm .
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5 Conclusion
We have taken up a line of research initiated by the introduction of Boolean games in [14] and
generalized in [17, 18] to  Lukasiewicz games. These are particular types of strategic games, where
the payoff function for each player is specified by a propositional formula (of classical logic or
some  Lukasiewicz logic, respectively) and where each strategy assigns truth values (Boolean or
many-valued) to the propositional variables under control of the player in question. The scope
of general strategic games that can be directly represented as Boolean or  Lukasiewicz games is
limited by the specific type of the formulas that represent the payoff functions. Motivated by
this observation, we present a more general approach referring to a wide class of algebras of truth
values in the real unit interval. For any such algebra A there is a corresponding notion of logical
A-game, where propositional formulas over the corresponding language LA express the players’
payoff functions. Based on a formal definition of the representability of a general strategic game
as a logical A-game, we have shown for several quite general classes of finite strategic games how
they can be represented as logical A-games. Furthermore we have shown that, for sufficiently
expressible algebras A, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a logical A-game can be
expressed by an A-formula. This is due to the observation that strategy profiles of logical games
can be identified with evaluations (truth-value assignments) and the fact that the equilibrium
conditions can be expressed by corresponding propositional formulas. As is well known, finite
strategic games always admit a Nash equilibrium in terms of mixed strategies. However, it has
been left open so far whether such mixed equilibria can be characterized by propositional formulas.
We have taken up this challenge and proved that, for sufficiently rich algebras A, one can encode
probability distributions over strategies (i.e., evaluations) and find an LA-formula that is satisfied
by an interpretation if and only if that interpretation encodes a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Several directions for future research seem natural. For example, we did not consider com-
plexity issues in this paper. Moreover, from a logical point of view, a particularly interesting
question arises for mixed equilibria in infinite games: The logical machinery developed here is
quite obviously insufficiently expressive to deal with probability distributions over infinite sets
of strategies. However, we conjecture that our results can be generalized also to that case by
employing quantified propositional logics (see, e.g., [2]).
Another option would be to deepen the research on the game-theoretic side with the goal of
characterizing the special structure of Nash equilibria associated with certain classes of infinite
games in which the payoffs are continuous and the strategy space of each player is isomorphic to
[0, 1]. The motivation comes from known results for separable (polynomial) games [10, Chapter 11]:
Every continuous game that falls within this class has at least one mixed Nash equilibrium whose
components are probability measures with finite supports. Specifically, let us suppose that each
player i ∈ N has [0, 1] as her strategy space. The payoff functions fi : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] are assumed
to be polynomials in n variables. Although the set of all mixed strategies in this game is the set
of all Borel probability measures over [0, 1], which is far beyond the scope of any straightforward
logic-based treatment, it is known that every polynomial game has a Nash equilibrium consisting
of finite mixed strategies pi only. Namely for every i ∈ N there exist strategies s1i , . . . , smi ∈ [0, 1]
and coefficients α1i , . . . , α
m
i ≥ 0 such that
∑m
j=1 α
j
i = 1 and
pi =
m∑
j=1
αji · δsji , (5)
where each δsji
is the Dirac probability distribution at sji . In [15] a sufficient condition for the
existence of finite mixed equilibria in constant-sum games given by McNaughton functions has
been given. This means that the scope of our logical analysis of mixed equilibria (Section 4.2) can
possibly be expanded further, capturing also the existence of equilibria of the type (5) directly in
a sufficiently strong propositional language LA.
Finally let us draw attention to the fact, that when Harrenstein et al. introduced Boolean games
in [14], they addressed several topics that go beyond the mere representability of certain games
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by logical formulas. In particular they also considered operations on games, a form of relativized
validity and satisfiability motivated by their games, and a calculus for deriving winning strategies.
It would be certainly interesting to see to what extent these and related topics can be developed
also in the considerably more general many-valued setting presented here.
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